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UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY
AN APPRAISAL
Rex A. Collings, Jr.*
One of the more perplexing judicial doctrines is unconstitutional uncer-
tainty, the doctrine which requires that a criminal statute be sufficiently
definite to give notice of the required conduct to those who would avoid
its penalties and to guide judge and jury in its application. The doctrine
is important since its application may result in the unconstitutionality of
a statute.
The uncertainty doctrine is inherently perplexing. A judgment that a
statute does or does not provide the required definiteness is necessarily
subjective. As Justice Frankfurter has pointed out" 'indefiniteness' is not
a quantitative concept. It is not even a technical concept of definite com-
ponents. It is itself an indefinite concept. There is no such thing as
'indefiniteness' in the abstract, by which the sufficiency of the requirement
expressed by the term may be ascertained." 1
There is no sharp line between language which is uncertain and lan-
guage which is certain. What is uncertain at one time may be certain at
another. What is uncertain to one justice may be certain to another.
What is uncertain to one justice in the civil liberties area may be certain
to the same justice in the economics sphere.2 Small wonder that it should
be suggested that decisions of invalidity are based upon "antagonism to
legislative policy rather than uncertainty concerning legislative meaning."'3
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 326, for biographical data. The views expressed
here are those of the author and should not be taken to reflect the views of the Department of
Justice.
1 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
2 As justice Frankfurter suggested in his dissent in Winters v. New York, supra note 1,
at 525, "the demands upon legislation, and its responses, are variable and multiform. That
which may appear to be too vague and even meaningless as to one subject matter may be
as definite as another subject-matter of legislation permits, if the legislative power to deal
with such a subject is not to be altogether denied."
3 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4920 (3d ed. 1943). Some idea of the erratic use
put to the doctrine can be gathered from comparison of the cases. Compare, for example,
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), where the phrase "crime involving moral turpi-
tude" was held sufficiently certain in a deportation statute, with Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S.
95 (1948), where a conviction for conspiracy to advocate and practice polygamy under a
prohibition of "any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade or com-
merce . . " was remanded for further state court action because the statute standing by
itself "would seem to be warrant for a conviction for agreement to do almost any act which
a judge and jury might find at the moment contrary to his or its notions of what was good
for health, morals, trade, commerce, justice or order." Compare United States v. Ragen, 314
U.S. 513 (1942), where the Court upheld a conviction for wilful evasion of income tax laws
by deducting more than the statutory "reasonable allowance for salaries," with United States
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Small wonder also that commentaries on the doctrine are so few.4
No one will deny that a criminal statute should be definite enough to
give notice of required conduct to those who would avoid its penalties, and
to guide judge and jury in its application and the attorney defending those
charged with its violation. Yet who would venture to divine what courts
will or will not find uncertain. To understand and rationalize the applica-
tions of the doctrine would require a philosopher's stone, for which one
may search in vain in the reported decisions. The more time spent in try-
ing to understand the doctrine, the less sure one becomes about its content.
Unfortunately no principle of law requires the terms of a judicial doctrine
to be sufficiently explicit to inform attorneys when it will or will not be
applied.
The pessimistic note of the previous paragraph was purposely sounded.
However, there are certain broad conclusions and principles which tenta-
tively can be drawn from an examination of the decisions of the Supreme
Court in the uncertainty field. The conclusions drawn here will no doubt
be subject to modification as a result of the decisions of the near future.
It has been found useful for present purposes to divide cases where the
Court has discussed unconstitutional uncertainty into two groups, which
for want of better terminology are called procedural due process uncer-
tainty cases and substantive due process uncertainty cases. This termi-
nology is seldom used by the Court itself.5
The procedural due process uncertainty cases are cases where the Court
was concerned with statutory language so obscure that it failed to give
adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide
proper standards for adjudication. The term is used as a short-hand ex-
pression for those uncertainty cases where the Court was occupied with
problems of fair notice of a penal sanction to the prospective defendants.
Thus if a statute makes it criminal to "waste" oil, a question may arise
as to whether the standard "waste" is clear enough adequately to warn
prospective defendants of what conduct may result in penal sanctions.
Can they reasonably be expected to know what is meant by "waste"?
v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), where a statute making it criminal to exact an
"unjust or unreasonable rate or charge" for necessities was held unconstitutionally uncertain.
4 The leading general article is Aigler, "Legislation in Vague or General Terms," 21 Mich.
L. Rev. 831 (1923) ; see, for a selected group of other commentaries: Quarles, "Some Statu-
tory Construction Problems and Approaches in Criminal Law," 3 Vand. L. Rev. 531 (1950) ;
Freund, "The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes," 30 Yale L. 3. 437 (1921); Notes, 62 Harv.
L. Rev. 77 (1948), 23 Ind. L. 3. 272 (1948).
5 The Court has itself proposed a classification. "The vagueness may be from uncertainty
in regard to persons within the scope of the act, . .. or in regard to the applicable tests to
ascertain guilt." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-516 (1948).
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The substantive due process uncertainty cases, on the other hand, are
those where the Court was concerned with statutory language so broad
and sweeping that it prohibited conduct protected by the Constitution,
usually by the principles of the First Amendment. An example would be
where a statute prohibited the sale of a magazine "principally made up
of criminal news." Here the primary issue is not fair and reasonable
notice to the accused, although that may be involved. Rather the issue is
whether the language is so broad that the sanctions of the statute may
apply to conduct within the protections of the principles of the First
Amendment, here to the sale of a type of magazine protected by the prin-
ciple of freedom of the press.
Ordinarily, the procedural due process cases involve no question of
whether the legislative body had a right to make the prohibition; the
question is whether it so expressed the prohibition that the prospective
defendant and the court which would try him can understand the statute.
However, the problem involved in the substantive due process uncertainty
cases is whether the legislative body, because of substantive constitutional
protections, had a right to prohibit the conduct at all.
The foregoing discussion, although it may assist in the understanding
of the terminology which is used here, over-simplifies the problems which
are discussed in the various decisions. The substantive and procedural
due process uncertainty cases may overlap. By the time a substantive due
process uncertainty case reaches the Supreme Court, it may involve not
only a broad statute which on its face violates constitutional freedoms,
but may also involve interpretations of the statute by various state courts
designed to narrow the statute so that it no longer violates the Constitu-
tion. The result of the interpretation by the state courts may be to
make the statute vague as well as apparently in violation of the principles
of the First Amendment.
The present purpose is primarily to examine critically the uncertainty
doctrine as expounded and applied in Supreme Court cases. The first two
major topics will be devoted to a discussion of the procedural and sub-
stantive due process uncertainty cases. During the course of the discus-
sion the attitude of individual members of the Court, particularly those
now on the bench, will be noted. At the same time an attempt will be
made to estimate the present vitality of each aspect of the doctrine.
Thirdly, a brief summary and critique will be made of the rationale and
explanations utilized by the Court when it avoids application of the doc-
trine. Finally, limited suggestions will be offered as to its future uses.
1955]
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I. UNCERTAINTY AS A VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Dilemma of Vague Statutes.
The application of a vague criminal statute presents a court with a
difficult dilemma. On the one hand, no one should be punished for con-
duct without knowing that it is criminal. On the other hand, legislative
pronouncements should not be lightly nullified.
The very statement of this dilemma suggests at least two alternatives
for a court confronted with the application of a vague criminal statute.
First, it can assume that the legislature had some purpose in mind, ascer-
tain the purpose, and then apply the statute to the situation at hand. This
has been the customary approach of common law courts since Heydon's
Case,' where Lord Coke suggested that the function of a court in applying
a statute is to determine the common law prior to enactment of the statute,
to identify the mischief and defect for which the common law did not pro-
vide, and to discover the remedy and reason for the remedy. He went on:
• . . then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction
as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro
privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, accord-
ing to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
A second alternative is to refuse to apply the vague statute in any case.
To assume that a statue always has meaning may be applauded by some
as proper deference to the legislative will. On the other hand, such an
approach has disadvantages. It means that the courts may have to strug-
gle with badly drafted statutes in countless cases. Would it not be better
for all concerned if application of an obscure statute was refused?
The problem becomes even more complicated when it is contended in
a federal court that a state statute is vague. A federal court is naturally
reluctant to undertake construction of a state statute. In addition to the
two alternatives above suggested, the court might also decide to avoid any
general conclusion and limit its holding to a declaration that the statute
was not applicable under the particular facts.'
6 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584).
7 This seems to have been the earlier view of the Court. Thus in United States v. Brewer,
139 U.S. 278, 288 (1891), a federal statute made it a crime for an officer at an election where
congressmen were voted upon to neglect to perform the duties imposed by federal or state
statutes. A state statute required election officers after the polls had closed to open the
ballots and count them. In refusing to read an implication into the statute that this counting
was to be done at the polling place the Court said: "Laws which create crime ought to be
so explicit that all men subject to their penalties may know what acts it is their duty to
avoid.. . . Before a man can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within
the statute."
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B. Early Void for Vagueness Cases
The foregoing was altogether too brief a discussion of the conflicting
policies which must be considered in a case involving a vague criminal stat-
ute. The result of this policy conflict, as might be expected, is that decisions
which hold statutory standards to be unconstitutionally vague are rare
indeed. In only six cases, only one involving a federal statute, has the
Supreme Court held a statute void for vagueness.
It was not until 1914 that the Court discovered a fatal uncertainty in a
statute. In International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,' a corporate defend-
ant had been convicted under state law of having entered into an agree-
ment to control the price of harvesters and thereafter selling them at
higher than their "real value." The conviction was under two statutes and
a constitutional provision which purported to outlaw price-fixing combina-
tions except those of growers of certain crops. These provisions had been
read together by the state courts, and to avoid unconstitutionality had
been construed only to outlaw any combination "for the purpose or with
the effect of fixing a price that was greater or less than the real value of
the article." The "real value" was declared to be the "market value under
fair competition, and under normal market conditions." A unanimous
Court reversed the conviction. Justice Holmes stated that to determine
"real value" as defined was a "problem that no human ingenuity could
solve." He said:
• . . if business is to go on, men must unite to do it and must sell their
wares. To compel them to guess on peril of indictment what the community
would have given for them if the continually changing conditions were other
than they are, to an uncertain extent; to divine prophetically what the reac-
tion of only partially determinate facts would be upon the imaginations and
desires of purchasers, is to exact gifts that mankind does not possess.9
The next case where the Court found unconstitutional uncertainty
8 234 U.S. 216 (1914) ; accord, International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 589 (1914);
Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634 (1914).
The historical basis of the doctrine is outlined in Aigler, supra note 4, and Note, 23 Ind.
L. J. 272 (1948). A chronological list of the developmental cases prior to 1914 follows: The
Enterprise, 8 Fed. Cas. 732, No. 4,499 (C.C.N.Y. 1810); United States v. Sharp, 27 Fed.
Cas. 1041, No. 16,264 (C.C. Pa. 1815); Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United States, 7 Cranch
52, 61 (U.S. 1812); United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (U.S. 1820); United States v.
Morris, 14 Pet. 464, 475 (U.S. 1840); United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 395 (U.S.
1868); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220 (1876); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Railroad
Commission of Tennessee, 19 Fed. 679 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1884); Railroad Commission Cases,
116 U.S. 307 (1886); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1888);
United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628 (1890); United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278
(1891); Tozer v. United States, 52 Fed. 917 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1892); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909).
9 234 U.S. at 223-224.
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involved a federal statute. In United States v. Cohen Grocery Co.
(1921),10 the Court found the Lever Act unconstitutional. The Lever
Act was the World War I profiteering statute as reenacted in 1919. It
penalized hoarding, restricting the supply or distribution, or reducing the
production of necessaries. It also punished the exacting of excessive
prices for necessaries. The particular provision before the Court in the
Cohen Grocery case made it unlawful wilfully to "make any unjust or un-
reasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any neces-
saries." The indictment alleged that the defendant sold sugar at an unjust
and unreasonable rate in violation of the Act. The defendant's demurrer
to the indictment was sustained. The Court in affirming held that the
statute did not fix an ascertainable standard of guilt. This lack of cer-
tainty was said to be evidenced by the confusing variations in the results
reached by several lower courts in applying the statute. Chief Justice
White also declared:
Observe that the section forbids no specific or definite act. It confines the
subject matter of the investigation which it authorizes to no element essen-
tially inhering in the transaction as to which it provides. It leaves open,
therefore, the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can
foresee and the result of which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard
against. . . to attempt to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent
of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and pun-
ished all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreasonable
in the estimation of the court and jury. 1
Justices Brandeis and Pitney concurred on the ground that the statute was
not intended to apply to the sale of merchandise, but only to services such
as hauling and storage, and that it was therefore unnecessary to pass on
the constitutional question.
The next procedural due process case where a statute was held uncon-
stitutionally uncertain, and perhaps the leading case, was Connally v.
General Construction Company'2 decided in 1926. Under the state stat-
ute involved, it was a crime for a contractor performing a government
contract to pay laborers, workmen and mechanics "less than the current
rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed." The
language undeniably is vague. What is the "current rate"? Is it the
minimum or maximum, or some intermediate amount? If the latter, what
10 255 U.S. 81 (1921); accord, Kennington v. Palmer, 255 U.S. 100 (1921); Kinnane v.
Detroit Creamery Co. 255 U.S. 102 (1921); Oglesby Grocery Co. v. United States, 255 U.S.
108 (1921); Tedrow'v. Lewis & Son Co., 255 U.S. 98 (1921); Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 255
U.S. 104 (1921) ; Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U.S. 109 (1921) ; cf. Small Co. v. American
Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925).
11 255 U.S. at 89.
12 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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intermediate amount-arithmetic mean, median, or something else? Will
deviations from the current rate be permitted for semi-retired and ineffi-
cient employees? What is meant by "locality"?
The Connally case arose on a suit in a federal court to enjoin enforce-
ment of a state statute. The contractor-plaintiff alleged that county
attorneys were threatening to enforce the statute which would deprive the
plaintiff and its agents of liberty and property without due process of law
because of the uncertainty in the statute. There were further allegations
that the Commissioner of Labor had made findings that the wages paid to
laborers in the vicinity of the town where the plaintiff's project was under
way ranged in lows from $3.00 to $4.00 per day, and in highs from $3.00
to $4.05 per day. The Commissioner had determined the "current rate"
to be $3.60, and had threatened to prosecute. The plaintiff's scale ranged
from $3.20 to $6.50 with only six of eighteen laborers being paid less than
$3.60.
The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional and impossible to
apply in any situation. Justice Sutherland stated the applicable principle
in these oft quoted words:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant
alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.13
Justices Holmes and Brandeis refused to sign this famous opinion.
They concurred on the ground that the statute had not been violated by
"any criterion available in the vicinity." In other words they refused to
hold the statute applicable under the particular facts.
The statute would seem sufficiently certain to permit its application in
marginal situations. One can readily suggest cases where there would be
no difficulty in applying it. For example, if the contractor was paying
twenty cents a day less than the lowest wage in the vicinity there would
be a clear violation of the statute. Or, on the other hand, if it were shown
that the contractor was paying more than any employer in the area there
could be no violation.
13 Id. at 391. The Court apparently overlooked the fact that it had earlier held almost
identical statutes constitutional. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903); Elkan v. Maryland,
239 U.S. 634 (1915), affirming Elkan v. State, 122 Md. 642, 90 Atl. 183 (1914). The decision
of the Maryland court in the Elkan case was based upon Sweeten v. State, 122 Md. 634, 90
AUt. 180 (1914). The Maryland court has indicated by way of dictum that it would not
follow the Connally decision. Ruark v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 157 Md.
576, 146 Atl. 797 (1929).
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In Cline v. Frink Dairy Co. (1927)," 4 a Colorado statute outlawing
specified conspiracies and combinations in restraint of trade except where
the object and purposes were "to conduct operations at a reasonable profit"
was held unconstitutional by a unanimous Court. The exception was said
to render the whole statute without a fixed standard of guilt. What con-
stitutes "a reasonable profit" was "an utterly impracticable standard for
a jury's decision." The real issue to be submitted to the jury would be
whether in their judgment the combination was necessary to enable those
engaged in it to operate at a reasonable profit. This was a legislative
rather than a judicial judgment. Submission of such a question to a jury
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court thought that the
provision outlawing conspiracies and combinations was sufficiently cer-
tain; the exception was what made the statute unenforceable.
In Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission (1932)15 a three judge court
declared invalid a provision which penalized one who produced "crude oil
or petroleum in the State of Oklahoma, in such a manner and under such
conditions as to constitute waste," the term waste being defined "in addi-
tion to its ordinary meaning [to] include economic waste, underground
waste, surface waste, and waste incident to the production. . . in excess
of transportation or marketing facilities or reasonable market demands."
The Supreme Court affirmed. After quoting the principle stated in the
Connally case, the Court noted:
It is not the penalty itself that is invalid but the exaction of obedience to a
rule or standard that is so vague and indefinite as to be really no rule or
standard at all.16
In applying this principle the Court said:
The meaning of the word "waste" necessarily depends upon many factors
subject to frequent changes. No act or definite course of conduct is specified
as controlling and, upon the trial of one charged with committing waste in
violation of the Act, the court could not foresee or prescribe the scope of the
inquiry that reasonably might have a bearing or be necessary in determining
whether in fact there had been waste. It is no more definite than would be
a mere command that wells shall not be operated in any way that is detri-
mental to the public interest. . .. 17
C. The Lanzetta Case
The latest decision in which the Court found statutory standards in-
sufficient came in 1939 in Lanzetta v. New Jersey.8 Three men were
14 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
15 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
16 Id. at 243.
17 Ibid.
18 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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convicted and sentenced to long prison terms under a statute which made
it a crime to be a gangster. The term "gangster" was defined to include
"Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a member
of a gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted at
least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has been convicted
of any crime." The decisions in the Lanzetta case give no clue to the facts
upon which conviction was based. The state court of appeals affirmed
rather summarily on the authority of an earlier decision in State v. Gay-
nor.19 The facts of that case are enlightening. The defendants, non-resi-
dents of New Jersey and ex-convicts, were seized while asleep in a secluded
hide-out. They were armed with loaded rifles, revolvers, shot guns, gre-
nades, blasting caps, and a gas riot gun with tear gas crystals. Much of
this equipment was stolen as were a number of automobile license plates
found in their possession.
The state court in the Gaynor case declared that the language of the
gangster statute could not be fairly categorized as vague or indefinite.
The evident aim of the statute was to make penal "the association of
criminals for the pursuit of criminal enterprises." However, in passing,
the court referred to dictionaries which defined a "gang" as a company of
persons acting together for some purpose "usually criminal" or going
about together or acting in concert "mainly for criminal purposes." The
Supreme Court in the Lanzetta case seized upon these dictionary defini-
tions as though they were part of the state court's construction of the
statute. It said: "So defined, the purposes of those constituting some gangs
may be commendable." In a unanimous decision it held the statute un-
constitutional as construed. Mr. Justice Butler said:
No one may be required at the peril of life, liberty or property to speculate
as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to
what the State commands or forbids ...
The challenged provision condemns no act or omission; the terms it employs
to indicate what it purports to denounce are so vague, indefinite and un-
certain that it must be condemned as repugnant to the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 0
Little can be added to the previous discussion in the way of a statement
of the procedural due process uncertainty doctrine which the Court has
developed. The language of a criminal statute must be sufficiently certain
to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will ren-
der them liable to penalties, and to guide the judge and jury in its applica-
tion. Two coordinate functions are served: guidance to the individual in
19 j9 N.J.L. 582, 198 AtI. 837 (1938).
20 306 U.S. at 453, 458.
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planning his future conduct, and guidance to those adjudicating his rights
and duties.2 1
D. Legal Rationale of Procedural Due Process Uncertainty
At this point it may be useful to discuss briefly the underlying legal
rationale which the Court has developed to justify holding such statutes
unconstitutionally uncertain. The Sixth Amendment requires that "in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation . . ." The Framers' concern in drafting the Sixth
Amendment was not with the definition of statutory crimes; rather it was
with the certainty of the common law indictment, with giving fair notice
to one accused of a common law crime. With the growth of statutory
crimes, statutory notice came to be as important as indictment notice;
without statutory certainty the Sixth Amendment would have provided
empty protection. What could be more natural than to construe the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment together with the information
clause of the Sixth Amendment to require that a statute fix an ascertain-
able standard of guilt. This was exactly what the Court did in the Cohen
Grocery case.
Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a similar
rationale would justify holding a state statute unconstitutionally uncer-
tain. In the Cline case, the Court noted the constitutional basis of Cohen
Grocery, and then went on to say that where state statutes were concerned,
the Fourteenth Amendment "requires that there should be due process of
law, and this certainly imposes upon a State an obligation to frame its
criminal statutes so that those to whom they are addressed may know
what standard of conduct is intended to be required. '22
An alternate constitutional basis for the doctrine is the requirement of
separation of powers. If a statute is so uncertain that a court could not
enforce it without rewriting it, the court could justify its refusal to do so
by merely declaring that it could not usurp the legislative function. This
apparently was the basis for decision in United States v. Evans. 23 The
statute was probably clear enough as to the crime, which was "to bring
into or land in the United States, . . . or . . . conceal or harbor" un-
authorized aliens, but not so clear as to the punishment which was a fine
21 See Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1948). Somewhat analogous to the procedural due
process uncertainty cases are those where the Court has found a presumption to be so arbi-
trary as to amount to a violation of the due process clause. See e.g., Manley v. Georgia, 279
U.S. 1 (1929) (presumption did not rest upon clearly specified elements); Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
22 274 U.S. 445, 458 (1927).
23 333 U.S. 483 (1948).
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and imprisonment "for each and every alien so landed or brought in."
Congress when amending the statute to prohibit concealing and harboring
as well as the landing of aliens had neglected to amend the punishment
clause. The Court held that the ambiguity concerning the penalty plus
some doubt as to the meaning of the terms "conceal" and "harbor" made
it too great a task to determine what penalty was intended for concealing
and harboring. It refused to make a judicial determination as a substitute
for what it believed to be a legislative function.
The implicit rationale of the Evans case is the doctrine of separation of
powers, a constitutional doctrine. However, it does not seem necessary
even to mention the Constitution in holding a statute uncertain. Why not
simply state that the statutory standards are so vague and obscure that
adjudication is impossible, and reverse the conviction? If the standards
are truly obscure there is no way of knowing of what the defendant was
convicted and no proper basis for any appellate review. In the Interna-
tional Harvester case where the uncertainty doctrine was first applied,
Justice Holmes did not find it necessary to resort to any discussion of the
Constitution.24
E. Problem of Borderline Situations
Some of the language in the Connally, Cohen Grocery, and Cline deci-
sions seems to suggest that a statute may be objectionable merely because
of a possibility that different juries may reach varying results in its appli-
cation. As a result a make-weight argument is often advanced by defend-
ants to the effect that a statute is unconstitutionally vague because of the
possibility of varying results. As might be expected the Court makes
short work of such contentions. Obviously few criminal provisions would
be constitutional if they were to be condemned merely because in some
borderline cases there would be no certainty as to the jury decision. In
Nash v. United States, Justice Holmes made the familiar statement that
"the law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating
rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of
degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short
imprisonment . . . ; he may incur the penalty of death."25 Again in
United States v. Wurzbach, he pointed out that "Whenever the law draws
a line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides. The
precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one can come near it
24 It was early suggested that no constitutional basis is needed. Aigler, supra note 4. In
cases before the International Harvester case, the Court would simply refuse to apply a
statute which it thought was uncertain. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, discussed in note 7,
supra.
25 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
1955]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
without knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is fam-
iliar to the criminal law to make him take the risk."126
The more recent cases are replete with similar expressions. Thus in
United States v. Ragen, in upholding an income tax evasion conviction for
deducting more than a "reasonable" allowance for salaries, the Court noted
that the "mere fact that a penal statute is so framed as to require a jury
upon occasion to determine a question of reasonableness is not sufficient to
make it too vague to afford a practical guide to permissible conduct.1 27 And
in Jordan v. De George, in the course of a determination that a tax fraud
was a "crime involving moral turpitude" under the deportation statutes,
the Court remarked that it had "several times held that difficulty in deter-
mining whether certain marginal offenses are within the meaning of the
language under attack as vague does not automatically render a statute
unconstitutional for indefiniteness." '28 In view of these cases one must con-
clude that the presence of difficult borderline or peripheral cases will not
invalidate a statute at least where there is a hard core of circumstances
to which the statute unquestionably applies and as to which the ordinary
person would have no doubt as to its application. 29
F. Applications of the Doctrine without Unconstitutionality
In most of the cases already discussed the uncertainty doctrine was
applied in such a way as to hold a statute unconstitutional. However the
doctrine can be used in other ways. For example, it can be applied to
deny the judicial enlargement of an otherwise acceptable statute. Thus
Pierce v. United States3" involved a statute making it criminal to pretend
to be an "officer. . .acting under the authority of the United States, or
any Department, or any officer of the Government thereof." It was
held material error to refuse to instruct that pretending to be an officer of
the Tennessee Valley Authority, a Government corporation, would not be
within the statutory prohibition. The Court declared that "judicial en-
largement of a criminal Act by interpretation is at war with a fundamental
concept of the common law that crimes must be defined with appropriate
26 280 u.S. 396, 399 (1930).
27 314 U.S. 513, 523 (1942).
28 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951).
29. Other cases containing language to the same effect as that cited in the text are: Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 534 (1948) (dissenting opinion) ; United States v. Petrillo, 332
U.S. 1, 7 (1947); Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286 (1945); Hygrade Provision
Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925) ; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S.
216, 223 (1914).
30 314 U.S. 306 (1941).
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definiteness." 3 It refused to hold that the impersonation of an officer of
a Government corporation was within the statutory prohibition.
Another such case, in the economic field, was Smith v. Cahoon. 2 There
a state statute prescribed a comprehensive scheme to regulate "auto trans-
portation companies," defined to include both public and private carriers
for hire. The Supreme Court held that such a scheme as applied to a
private carrier for hire was beyond the power of the state. It was then
contended that a severability provision saved parts of the statute, such as
an insurance provision, as applied to the private carrier. But the Court
said that separation of the valid portions of the statute was a problem for
the state courts; "until such separation has been accomplished by judicial
decision, the statute remains with its inclusive purport, and those con-
cerned in its application have no means of knowing definitely what even-
tually will be eliminated and what will be left." The Court went on to
say that even if it could be said that the provisions of the statute could be
severed so as to provide one scheme for common carriers and another for
private carriers, until such severance could be determined by competent
authority the statute would be void for uncertainty.
Either the statute imposed upon the appellant obligations to which the State
had no constitutional authority to subject him, or it failed to define such
obligations as the State had the right to impose with the fair degree of cer-
tainty which is required of criminal statutes.33
The uncertainty doctrine has seldom been utilized by the Court except
where penal sanctions were involved. In Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel,34 it
was suggested that the doctrine is not even applicable in civil cases. The
case involved a World War I rent control statute making it a partial de-
fense to a rent action that "such rent is unjust and unreasonable and that
the agreement under which the same is sought to be recovered is oppres-
sive." It was urged that the standard was too indefinite to satisfy the due
process clause. The Court in summarily disposing of this contention said:
The standard of the statute is as definite as the "just compensation" stand-
ard adopted in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and therefore
ought to be sufficiently definite to satisfy the Constitution. United States v.
Cohen Grocery Co.. . ., dealing with definitions of crime, is not applicable. 35
However, in Small v. American Sugar Refining Co.,36 three years later,
31 Id. at 311.
32 283 U.S. 553 (1931)
33 Id. at 564. Seemingly, however, the statute was perfectly valid and applicable to
public carriers for hire.
34 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
35 Id. at 250.
36 267 U.S. 233 (1925); cf. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 463-464 (1927) (dis-
cussing the non-penal provisions of the statute discussed in the text at note 14 supra).
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the Court refused to follow the Levy Leasing case. The case involved an
action for breach of contracts, one defense being that the contracts were
illegal because of the Lever Act. The defense was demurred to on the
ground that the Lever Act had earlier been held void for vagueness in the
Cohen Grocery case. The Court distinguished the Levy Leasing case,
noting that the statute in that case had been held to supply a sufficient
standard. It then held that the Cohen Grocery case was applicable. "The
ground or principle of the decisions, was not such as to be applicable only
to criminal prosecutions. It was not the criminal penalty that was held
invalid but the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard which was so
vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all."
3 7
There seems to be no reason why application of the doctrine should be
limited to criminal statutes. The scope of the due process clauses goes
beyond penal deprivations of life, liberty or property. However, since the
Small case, apparently the doctrine has been applied by the Supreme Court
in non-criminal cases only where deportation statutes were involved. 8
The Court has been reluctant to strike down delegations of legislative
powers to administrative officials under vague or indefinite standards even
when penal sanctions were involved. In no case since 1936 has a congres-
sional delegation of powers to an administrative agency been found un-
lawful.3 9 Thus in United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative Inc.,4" the
standard for milk price-fixing by the Secretary of Agriculture was that
the price should reflect the "price of feeds, the available supplies of feeds,
and other economic conditions which affect the market supply and demand,
for milk." The penal order in question of which the Secretary asked en-
forcement fixed a fluctuating area milk price based only upon wholesale
butter prices. The Secretary, in the face of the statutory standard, had
taken only a single factor into account in his price determination. Fur-
thermore he had evidently made a determination that wholesale butter
prices were included in the vague phrase "other economic conditions."
The Court in upholding both the order and the delegation declared: "we
cannot say that it is beyond the power of Congress to leave this determina-
tion to a designated administrator, with the standards named."
The dissenting opinions pointed out that the statute clearly allowed the
administrator "to prescribe according to his own errant will and then to
execute," "' that it was "evident that the Secretary is to form a judgment
37 267 U.S. at 239.
38 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
39 See the excellent discussion of the general problem of standards in delegation in Davis,
Administrative Law c. 2 (1951).
40 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
41 Id. at 582.
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by balancing a price-raising policy against a consumer-protection policy,
according to his views of feasibility and public interest."4"
It may seem difficult to read the Rock Royal opinions without feeling
indignant and outraged. However, there is'something to be said for the
principle involved (even if it is difficult to agree with its application under
the particular facts). Where statutory sanctions are purely of prospective
effect, it may be unnecessary to require the same definiteness as where the
penal sanction comes only after the issuance or violation of an injunction
or other court order. If there can be no deprivation of life, liberty or
property until a court order is issued and violated, the statutory language
can be quite vague; it is the order itself which should be specific.43 Con-
versely, however, if such deprivation can happen, for example where the
statute permits an injured private person to sue for treble damages, even
before any court enforcement order, it seems rather obvious that statutory
definiteness must be required if due process is to be regarded.44
G. Recent Procedural Due Process Cases
Cases involving contentions that standards are vague still come
before the Court. Four such cases, all decided in 1952 and 1953, may
assist in showing the current temper of the justices.
In Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States,45 the Court considered
a penal regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission which re-
quired operators of motor vehicles transporting explosives and other
dangerous substances to "avoid, so far as practicable, and, where feasible,
by prearrangement of routes, driving into or through congested thorough-
fares, places where crowds are assembled, street car tracks, tunnels,
viaducts, and dangerous crossings."4 The corporate owner of a truck
which exploded in the Holland Tunnel was indicted for violating the
regulation, and successfully urged in the district court that the words
"so far as practicable, and, where feasible" made the standard of guilt
conjectural.47 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.48
The Supreme Court upheld the regulation by a six to three decision.
Justice Clark speaking for the majority recognized the existence of a
requirement of certainty but refused to find the regulation in question
42 H. P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U.S. 588, 605 (1939) (this dissenting opinion
also is part of the Rock Royal opinions).
43 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 54 (1948); cf. Labor Board v. Express Pub.
Co., 312 U.S. 426, 433 (1941) (injunction).
44 But cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
45 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
46 49 Code Fed. Reg. § 197.1(b).
47 90 F. Supp. 996 (D. N.J. 1950).
48 188 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1951).
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unconstitutional. Three members of the Court, Justices Jackson, Black
and Frankfurter, thought that the regulation did not provide a definite
standard upon which a trucker could calculate his duty.
In United States v. Spector49 the federal statute involved made it a
crime for an alien ordered deported to "willfully fail or refuse to make
timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary
to his departure." The district court held the statute unconstitutionally
vague and indefinite because it did not specify the nature of the travel
documents necessary for departure nor indicate to which country or to
how many countries the alien should make application.5" The Supreme
Court reversed, upholding the statute by a five to three decision. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the majority felt that the statute on its face met
the constitutional tests of certainty and definiteness. Justice Black dis-
sented on the ground that the statute was void for vagueness. Justice
Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, dissented on the ground that
no provision was made for a judicial trial of the validity of the deportation
order.5
Another case decided in 1952 was United States v. Cardiff, 2 where
the Court refused to accept a liberal construction of a badly drafted
statute. The president of a company was convicted of violating Section
301(f) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.53 Section 301(f)
prohibited "refusal to permit entry or inspection as authorized by Section
704." Section 704 authorized entry and inspection of certain types of
plants at reasonable times, "after first making request and obtaining per-
mission of the owner, operator, or custodian."54 The facts were that
authorized agents had asked permission to enter and inspect the defend-
ant's factory and he had refused such permission.
The Government urged the Court to interpret the Act to prohibit a
refusal to permit entry or inspection at any reasonable time, that otherwise
the Act would have no real sanctions. The Court noted this argument,
and also noted that on its face the Act prohibited only refusal to permit
inspection if permission had previously been granted, which would seem
to make revocation of permission criminal no matter when it had been
granted.
The Court affirmed reversal of the conviction by an eight to one
decision (Justice Burton dissenting without opinion). The Court dis-
49 343 U.S. 169 (1952).
50 99 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
51 This question was not raised by appellee, nor briefed or argued by either party.
52 344 U.S. 174 (1952).
53 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1952).
54 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1952).
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cussed the Government's contention which it said was contrary to the
express words of the statute:
However we read §301 (f) we think it is not fair warning ... to the factory
manager that if he fails to give consent, he is a criminal. The vice of vague-
ness in criminal statutes is the treachery they conceal either in determining
what persons are included or what acts are prohibited. Words which are
vague and fluid. . . may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the an-
cient laws of Caligula. We cannot sanction taking a man by the heels for
refusing to grant the permission which this Act on its face apparently gave
him the right to withhold. That would be making an act criminal without
fair and effective notice. .... 55
United States v. Gambling Devices,56 decided in 1953, is also of
interest since it casts some light on the views of Chief Justice Warren.
In that case, the Court by a five to four vote sustained three judgments
dismissing two indictments and a libel proceeding brought under the "Slot
Machine Act." 7 Section 3 of the Act is undoubtedly ambiguous. It
requires manufacturers of and dealers in specified gambling devices to
register with "the Attorney General . . . in such district," and to file
certain reports "in the district." Nothing on the face of the statute shows
what "district" is referred to, although the legislative history shows that
under the Act as originally drafted, it was contemplated that the reports
would be filed with the collector of internal revenue in each collection
district. When it was decided to require that the reports be filled with the
Attorney General, the phrases "in such district" and "in the district" were
inadvertently allowed to remain in the bill which was enacted. The At-
torney General issued a regulation to clarify the ambiguity.
The indictments and libel were drawn on the theory that the regis-
tration and reporting requirements of the statute were applicable to all
manufacturers and dealers of slot machines whether or not they engaged
in interstate commerce. Justices Jackson, Frankfurter and Minton re-
fused, however, to permit the statute to apply to manufacturers and
dealers engaged only in intrastate commerce. They adopted the narrow
construction of the trial courts. They felt that this construction made it
unnecessary to decide whether the Act could constitutionally apply to
intrastate manufacturers and dealers under the commerce clause. They
also felt that this construction made it unnecessary to reach the vague-
ness issue. They voted to affirm the judgments below which had dis-
missed the indictments and the libel. Justices Black and Douglas joined
with them in voting to affirm the judgments. They thought, however,
55 344 U.S. at 176-177.
56 346 U.S. 441 (1953).
57 64 Stat. 1134 (1951), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1177 (1952).
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that because of the ambiguity in the Act, it was unconstitutionally vague.
A manufacturer or dealer could not know what "district" was referred
to. Nor could this vagueness be corrected by the Attorney General's
regulation.
Justice Clark, with Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Reed and Bur-
ton concurring, wrote the minority opinion. He thought the Act was
sufficiently certain. Aside from Section 291 of Title 5 of the United States
Code which provides that the Attorney General shall be at the seat of the
Government, he thought it was common knowledge that the Attorney
General was located in Washington, D. C. He said:
No doubt the forgotten words in the Act provide room for quibbling; and
the lawyer who is looking for litigation, or whose client seeks to avoid com-
pliance with the law, can paint a picture of uncertainty and frustrated effort
to fathom the unfathomable intent of Congress. But to me it is certain that,
with or without the regulations, a person honestly seeking to comply with
this law would inevitably have succeeded, without undue mental strain in
determining the statute's import and without uncertainty as to his chances
of remaining within the bounds of the law.58
Justice Clark simply could not see the Act as "a trap for the unwary."
Finally, he argued that in view of the established tie-up between slot
machines and national crime syndicates, it is within the power of Con-
gress to require all manufacturers and dealers of such devices to register
and report, whether or not they engage in interstate commerce.
H. Evaluation of Present Vitality
Aside from Lanzetta and perhaps International Harvester, it is hard
to read the procedural due process uncertainty cases without a feeling
that their value as precedents, at least on the merits, may be subject to
a considerable doubt. They are generally cases involving economic
regulation, decided before the mid-Thirties. It is naive to believe that
the Court would now find any insurmountable constitutional difficulties
in a statute which made it criminal to produce petroleum "in such a
manner and under such conditions as to constitute waste." Yet that is
exactly what the Court did in the Champlin case without a word of dis-
sent even from Justices Brandeis, Stone or Cardozo. The Connally,
Cohen Grocery and Cline cases are subject to the same reservation. Per-
haps the rather primitive statutes involved in the International Harvester
case might be found objectionable by the present Court, although the
results under the Robinson-Patman Act might suggest a contrary result.
The Lanzetta case stands apart from the others. Justice Frankfurter
classes it as somewhat of an aberration since it involved a statute designed
58 346 U.S. 458 (1953).
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to meet problems similar to those at which vagrancy statutes are directed.
"These statutes are in a class by themselves in view of the familiar abuses
to which they are put. . . .Definiteness is designedly avoided so as to
allow the net to be cast at large, to enable men to be caught who are
vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and prosecution, although not
chargeable with any particular offense."59 The Lanzetta statute is almost
as objectionable as an ancient Chinese statute which read: "Whoever is
guilty of improper conduct, and of such as is contrary to the spirit of the
laws, though not a breach of any specific part of it, shall be punished at least
forty blows; and when the impropriety is of a serious-nature, with eighty
blows.""0 As construed by the state courts and understood by the majority
of the Supreme Court it was a grant of blanket authority to law enforce-
ment officers to incarcerate unemployed ex-convicts. The objection to the
statute was to its breadth rather than to its obscurity. As viewed by
the Court it gave unbridled license to the police and district attorneys to
imprison a class of citizens. In this respect it resembles statutes held
unconstitutional in the substantive due process cases shortly to be dis-
cussed, because of the breadth of the prohibition rather than because of
the vagueness of standards. It also resembles the statutes held invalid
which gave administrative officials the power to license not only punish-
able speech and assembly, but also constitutionally protected activities.
The Lanzetta case therefore is somewhat of a freak. Furthermore
it is the only case since 1932, where the Court has expressly found statutory
standards unconstitutionally uncertain. The current reluctance to hold
economic and other statutes "not entwined with limitations on free ex-
pression" vague, as well as a similar reluctance to hold any federal
statutes unconstitutional, has been frankly recognized by the Court."'
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court as presently constituted
will hold a statute unconstitutional because of vague standards except as
an extreme measure, as in the Lanzetta case, the only such case since 1932.
However, the docrine still has considerable vigor. Two justices, Frank-
furter and Black, seem to be willing to apply the doctrine to hold a statute
unconstitutional. 2 Justice Reed has occasionally dissented where a
59 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
60 Quoted by justice (then Circuit judge) Brewer in Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 35
Fed. 866, 876 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1888). The Uniform Code of Military justice, 64 Stat. 142
(1950), 50 U.S.C. § 728 (1952), makes criminal the following: "... all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces ..."
81 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 517 (1948); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223,
245 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
62 In addition to their dissents in the Boyce and Spector cases, see Jordan v. De George,
341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
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majority thought a statute was sufficiently certain.6 3 Furthermore, there
are situations, as in the Cardiff case, where the doctrine will be applied
in such a way as practically to nullify a statute, without expressly de-
claring it unconstitutional. Only Justice Burton dissented in Cardiff. One
cannot say that the doctrine is dead. Counsel are well justified in con-
tinuing to urge it.
II. UNCERTAINTY AS A VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DuE PROCESS
There remain to be considered the substantive due process un-
certainty cases, those where the statute was so broad and sweeping as to
prohibit conduct protected by the Constitution." This is an area where
the Supreme Court, at least in the twenty years since the mid-Thirties,
has seemingly recognized its special competence.65 As might be expected
it is an area where the uncertainty doctrine has considerable vitality.
However, even in this area the Court is reluctant to hold statutes un-
constitutionally uncertain. There have been but three cases, all involv-
63 See, e.g., United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); cf. his dissents based upon
a strict construction argument in United States v. Hood, 343 U.S. 148, 152 (1952), and
United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 705 (1948).
64 Substantive due process uncertainty has roots in earlier cases. In United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876), the Court refused to construe a broad federal statute narrowly so
as to apply only in areas where Congress had the power to legislate. Again in the Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), the Court refused narrow construction to a broad statute
beyond the power of Congress (trade mark legislation framed to apply to intra as well as
interstate commerce) on authority of United States v. Reese, supra. In James v. Bowman,
190 U.S. 127 (1903), the Court had before it a federal statute which purported to punish
individuals hindering the right of suffrage guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment. The
statute was beyond the power of Congress because the Fifteenth Amendment was held to
apply only to state action. In refusing narrow construction so that the statute would apply
to congressional elections, an area where Congress did have the power to legislate, the Court
said (at 142): ". . . it is all-important that a criminal statute should define clearly the offense
which it purports to punish, and that when so defined it should be within the power of the
legislative body enacting it . . . courts are not at liberty to take a criminal statute, broad
and comprehensive in its terms and in these terms beyond the power of Congress and change
it to fit some particular transaction which Congress might have legislated for if it had seen
fit" In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926), a Philippine statute aimed at tax
evasion forbade the keeping of account books "in any language other than English, Spanish
or any local dialect." The statute, being aimed at Chinese merchants, was in violation of
the equal protection clause, so the Philippine courts interpreted it only to require keeping
those books reasonably adapted to the needs of taxing authorities in the specified languages.
The Supreme Court refused to accept this construction because it created "a vague require-
ment, and one objectionable in a criminal statute." The Court said (at 518): "We are likely
thus to trespass on the provision of the Bill of Rights that the accused is entitled to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him; and to violate the principle that a statute
which requires the doing of an act so indefinitely described that men must guess at its mean-
ing, violates due process of law." The Court then cited Connally, Cohen 'Grocery, Inter-
national Harvester, and United States v. Reese, supra, relying principally upon the latter.
65 See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 517 (1948).
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ing state statutes, where unconstitutionality of a statute was primarily
predicated upon substantive due process uncertainty.
A. Stromberg v. California
In Stromberg v. California,66 decided in 1931, there was a conviction
under a state statute which made it criminal to display a red flag for any
of three purposes: "[1] as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to
organized government or [2] as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic
action or [3] as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character."
The information upon which the conviction was based alleged display
of a red flag for the three forbidden purposes, stating them, of course,
conjunctively rather than disjunctively as in the statute. The trial court
instructed the jury that the defendant could be convicted if she had
displayed the red flag for any one or more of the three purposes. At the
defendant's request the court also instructed in effect that she had an
unlimited right to advocate peaceful changes in the government, and to
adopt a flag signifying such a purpose, and that such a display could
not be unlawful. The defendant's counsel not only made no objection to
the instructions as given, but also stated in open court that he was sat-
isfied that they were correct, and that his client waived any error on that
account. His briefs and arguments before the Supreme Court were
based upon the theory that the statute was unconstitutional in its entirety.
The Court's decision, however, was based upon the doctrine of un-
constitutional uncertainty. The state appellate court had recognized that
the portion of the statute which forbade display of the red flag for the
first purpose, that is "as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organ-
ized government," was subject to a construction which would include dis-
play as a symbol of peaceful and orderly opposition. Furthermore, under
one of the instructions of the trial court, conviction was permitted if the
flag was displayed solely for that forbidden first purpose. The Court
held that under the statute as construed by the state appellate court there
could be no conviction for display of the red flag for the first purpose,
that is as a symbol of opposition to organized government. As a result,
the instruction that the defendant could be convicted if she displayed the
red flag for any of the three purposes was erroneous, since under that
instruction, because of the general verdict, there was no way of knowing
whether the conviction had rested solely upon the first purpose. The
Court said:
A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague
and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of [free political
66 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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discussion] is repugnant to the guarantee of liberty contained in the Four-
teenth Amendment. 67
A bitter dissenting opinion by Justice Butler pointed out that the
majority had isolated one part of the charge to the jury and construed
it as if it stood alone. He felt that in the light of other instructions,
particularly the instruction that the defendant had an unlimited right
to display the red flag to signify a purpose of advocating peaceful changes
in the government, the error could not possibly have been prejudicial.
B. Herndon v. Lowry
The next such decision came in 1937 in Herndon v. Lowry. 8 In that
case a state insurrection statute was declared unconstitutional as con-
strued and applied, by a five to four decision.
Insurrection was defined under the statute as "any combined resis-
tance to the lawful authority of the State, with intent to the denial thereof,
when the same is manifested or intended to be manifested by acts of
violence." The conviction was based upon acts which included soliciting
members for the Communist party, conducting meetings of a party cell,
and possessing party literature. The trial court instructed that there
could be no conviction unless there was evidence that "immediate serious
violence" was expected or advocated. The defendant argued before the
state supreme court on appeal that there was no evidence upon which to
base such an instruction. That court held that "imminence" of the use of
force was not required under that statute, that intended use of force was
sufficient, and sustained the conviction.
Under the "clear and present danger" doctrine as then understood,
the statute as construed and applied was a prior restraint upon speech
and other activity protected under the Fourteenth Amendment by the
principles of the First Amendment, and was therefore unconstitutional.
Justice Roberts for the Court said:
Proof that the accused in fact believed that his effort would cause a violent
assault upon the state would not be necessary to a conviction. It would be
sufficient if the jury thought he reasonably might foretell that those he per-
suaded to join the party might, at some time in the indefinite future, resort
to forcible resistance of government. ...
The statute, as construed and applied, amounts merely to a dragnet which
may enmesh anyone who agitates for a change of government if a jury can
be persuaded that he ought to have foreseen his words would have
some effect in the future conduct of others. No reasonably ascertainable
standard of guilt is prescribed. So vague and indeterminate are the bound-
67 Id. at 369.
68 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
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aries thus set to the freedom of speech and assembly that the law necessarily
violates the guarantees of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.6 9
C. The Winters Case
The next case is the leading case of Winters v. New York7 0 decided
in 1948 after being argued three times. The two opinions are notable
discussions of the uncertainty doctrine. They undoubtedly contain the
best analysis to date of the chameleonic facets of the doctrine both in the
procedural and substantive due process areas.
The Winters case involved a conviction under a state statute making
it criminal to possess with intent to sell a publication "principally made
up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or
pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime." The defendant
was charged with possession with intent to sell an obscene, lewd, lasciv-
ious, filthy, indecent and disgusting magazine principally made up of the
forbidden classes of items. The New York Court of Appeals stated that
the legislative purpose of the statute was based upon the fact that col-
lections of pictures or stories of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust "un-
questionably can be so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent
and depraved crimes against the person." The publications found in the
defendant's possession were clearly of the type the statute was designed
to reach.7 1 The court held, therefore, that it was unnecessary to decide
whether the statute extended to publications made up of accounts of
criminal deeds not characterized by bloodshed or lust.
The Supreme Court by a six to three decision held that the statute
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice
Reed for the majority said: "On its face . . . [the statute] covers de-
tective stories, treatises on crime, reports of battle carnage. . . . It does
not seem to us that an honest distributor of publications could know
when he might be held to have ignored such a prohibition." The statute
was held unconstitutional upon the authority of the Stromberg and
Herndon cases. Justice Reed also stated:
It is settled that a statute so vague and indefinite, in form and as inter-
preted, as to permit within the scope of its language the punishment of
incidents fairly within the protection of the guarantee of free speech is void,
on its face, as contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.. .. A failure of a
69 Id. at 262-264.
70 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
71 It contained "a collection of crime stories which portray[ed] in vivid fashion tales of
vice, murder and intrigue . . . embellished with pictures of fiendish and gruesome crimes, and
... besprinkled with lurid photographs . . . bear[ing] such titles as 'Bargains in Bodies,'
'Girl Slave to a Love Cult' . . ." People v. Winters, 268 App. Div. 30, 48 N.Y.S. 2d 230
(1944).
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
statute limiting freedom of expression to give fair notice of what acts will
be punished and such a statute's inclusion of prohibitions against expressions,
protected by the principles of the First Amendment, violates an accused's
rights under procedural due process and freedom of speech or press.7 2
The minority of the Court, Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton, did
not question the existence of these principles; however, they doubted their
applicability under the particular facts. They implied that the Court
should show a little more respect for a statute which had stood for more
than 60 years, and was in effect in nineteen other states in similar form
D. Procedural Due Process Cases Distinguished
Stromberg, Herndon and Winters are the only substantive due pro-
cess cases where the uncertainty doctrine was applied to hold a statute
unconstitutional. To class these cases with Connally and like cases would
certainly be improper. They are completely distinguishable. The Strom-
berg conviction was reversed because of the chance that the jury might
have based guilt upon display of the red flag as a symbol of peaceful and
orderly opposition to organized government. The Herndon conviction
was reversed because the jury might have felt justified in convicting if
it thought that the defendant might reasonably foretell that those who
joined the Communist party might at some future time resort to forcible
resistance to the government. Winters was freed because the statute
under which he was convicted might have been applied to forbid posses-
sion of detective stories, crime treatises and reports of battle carnage.
In each case a majority of the Court was fearful that the particular
statute could be applied to forbid conduct protected by the privileges of
freedom of speech and assembly under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Whether the particular defendant on trial was
guilty of acts which could have been punished under a narrowly drawn
statute without violating those privileges was considered irrelevant to
the decisions.
Seemingly it was the broad reach of the statute that disturbed the
Court in each of the three cases. Although the Court spoke of "vague"
language, its real concern was the broad or sweeping language that could
be applied to permit conviction for acts protected by the principles of the
First Amendment. In other words "vagueness" in this area is different
from the obscurity of standards that is forbidden by the procedural due
process certainty requirement. The problem of standards, of procedural
due process, if present at all was subordinate. The rule of these latter
cases is that a statute cannot be drawn in terms so broad as to permit
72 333 U.S. 507, 509-510 (1948).
[Vol. 40
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY
conviction for acts protected by the Constitution, particularly acts pro-
tected by the principles of the First Amendment.
The vice of such statutes is that their broad language may throttle
protected conduct. They have a coercive effect since rather than chance
prosecution people will tend to leave utterances unsaid even though they
are protected by the Constitution. Furthermore, even a successful de-
fense to an action under such a statute may be expensive. To allow every
defendant to raise the question of constitutionality, even he who could
constitutionally be punished for his utterances under a properly drawn
statute, may speed termination of the restriction.73
E. Is the Substantive Due Process Uncertainty Doctrine Necessary?
The question may occur, why bother to talk about uncertainty and
vagueness in these cases. The uncertainty if any is a minor objection
when compared to the breadth of the language. The statute on its face
and as construed prohibits protected conduct. Why not merely hold it
unconstitutional under the principles of the First Amendment? Why
bother with any "vagueness" phraseology? Interestingly enough the
Court in De Jonge v. Oregon,74 decided three months before the Herndon
case, reached an equivalent result without ever using the terms "vague-
ness," or "uncertainty." In the De Jonge case a criminal syndicalism
statute had been construed to permit conviction of a defendant who had
done no more than assist in the conduct of a lawful public meeting,
conducted however under the auspices of the Communist party. The
Court held that the statute as construed and applied under the particular
indictment was an unconstitutional interference with freedom of speech
and assembly. It had earlier upheld similar statutes and doubtless was
desirous of avoiding the necessity of overruling or distinguishing earlier
decisions. It did however mention in passing the "broad reach of the
statute" as construed and applied.75
More recently in Terminiello v. Chicago76 the Court reached a
similar result without discussing the uncertainty doctrine. In that case
the statute made aiding or assisting in making a "breach of the peace"
a misdemeanor. The defendant was convicted of making a speech which
provoked a hostile mob, incited a friendly one, and threatened violence
between the two. The trial court charged that under the statute "breach
of the peace" consisted of any "misbehavior which violates the public
73 See Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1208 (1948) ; cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
74 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
75 Id. at 362.
76 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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peace and decorum," and that the "misbehavior may constitute a breach
of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a
condition of unrest, or creates, a disturbance." This portion of the charge
was not objected to or even argued to be erroneous. However, the
Supreme Court held that a conviction resting on such a charge could
not stand. It based reversal upon the Stromberg case because under the
general verdict the conviction might have rested upon unconstitutional
portions of the statute.
It would seem unnecessary to use the terminology of void for
vagueness in cases like Stromberg, Herndon and Winters. The doctrine
is of doubtful value in this area since any statute is void which as con-
strued permits the punishment of incidents protected by the guarantees of
the First Amendment, not just the so-called vague or indefinite statutes.
The result can be more simply reached by stating that the statute as
construed and applied violates the principles of the First Amendment as
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. To borrow from terminology
used elsewhere, these might be called "spurious" uncertainty cases, the
procedural due process cases being "true" uncertainty cases.
F. Recent Substantive Due Process Uncertainty Cases
The decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois77 rendered in 1952 may assist
in showing the current temper of the Court in the Winters area. The
case involved a statute which made it a crime to sell or publish any
lithograph, moving picture, play, drama, or sketch which "portrays de-
pravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens,
of any race, color, creed or religion which . . . exposes the citizens of
any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or
which is productive of breach of the peace or riots." The defendant was
convicted of publishing a lithograph in the form of a petition to Chicago
city officials to halt encroachments by Negroes. The publication con-
tained the following: "If persuasion and the need to prevent the white
race from being mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the
aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the
negro, surely will."" 8
The statute is analogous in language, although not in purpose, to
the statute involved in the Winters case. Yet it was held constitutional
in a five to four decision. Justice Frankfurter as spokesman for the
majority (he had written the minority opinion in Winters) upheld the
statute against contentions that it violated liberty of speech and of the
77 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
78 Id. at 252.
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press. He summarily denied the contention that it was so broad that the
general verdict might have been based upon constitutionally protected
conduct. Justice Jackson dissented because of rulings of the trial court
which precluded the defenses of truth, fair comment and privilege, as
well as because of lack of clear showing that there existed a clear and
present danger that a breach of the peace might have resulted. Justice
Black, with Justice Douglas concurring, dissented upon the ground that
the statute violated the First Amendment. Justice Reed, also with
Justice Douglas concurring, dissented upon the ground that the judg-
ment might well have rested upon the vague words "virtue," "derision,"
and "obloquy," which would permit within their scope punishment of
incidents secured by the guarantee of freedom of speech.
Justice Reed's opinion was reminiscent of that of the majority in the
Stromberg case. He quoted the statute after striking out all of the terms
which were sufficiently definite. So stated the statute and indictment
made it criminal to portray in a lithograph a "lack of virtue of a class of
citizens . . . which . . . exposes [them to] derision, or obloquy." He
then proceeded to demonstrate that the words "virtue," "derision," and
"obloquy," are words of varying meanings which could include conduct
protected by the First Amendment. On the basis of this construction he
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional. He did not consider
whether the term "lack of virtue" can be given meaning other than in
context with the terms "depravity, criminality, unchastity," which pre-
cede it. Yet, it would seem that to read it otherwise is to distort its mean-
ing, as well as to ignore the background of race riots which brought about
enactment of the statute.
It is interesting to compare the line-up of the Court in Winters and
Beaularnais. Justices Frankfurter and Burton thought that both statutes
were constitutional, while Justices Reed, Black and Douglas thought both
were unconstitutional. Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Jackson changed
sides. The Chief Justice thought the statute in Winters unconstitutional,
but sided with the majority in Beaukarnais. Justice Jackson thought the
statute in Winters constitutional but dissented in Beaukarnais. However,
although his position in the latter case seemed inconsistent with his posi-
tion in the former, the language of his opinions was not. Justices Murphy,
and Rutledge voted for unconstitutionality in Winters. Their successors,
Justices Minton and Clark, sided with the majority in Beauharnais, thus
holding the balance which resulted in the holding of constitutionality.
One comes from reading the Beauzarnais opinions with a feeling that
the current members of the Court, albeit with dissent, probably would
have reached a different result than that reached in the Stromberg, Hem-
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don and Winters cases, or at least would have decided them with little
discussion of uncertainty. The majority in Beaukarnais rather summarily
dismissed the uncertainty argument, devoting most of its discussion to
the prolem of freedom of speech and the power of the state to restrict
it in dealing with local problems. Only Justices Reed and Douglas showed
any real concern with uncertainty. The implication of the decision would
seem to be that if such a statute is struck down by the current Court it
will be upon the ground that it violates the principles of the First Amend-
ment, unadorned by any discussion of void for vagueness.
Another important 1952 decision was Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,79
where the Court struck down the administrative censoring of a motion
picture as "sacrilegious." The statute required a license to exhibit
a motion picture and permitted rejection of a film found to be "obscene,
indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or . . . [to] tend to corrupt
morals or incite to crime." The censor first granted then revoked the
license of the distributor of "The Miracle," a story of a simple-minded
goatherdess who thought that the stranger who seduced her and caused
her pregnancy was St. Joseph. The New York Court of Appeals in up-
holding the censor had defined "sacrilegious" so broadly as to give almost
unlimited control. In a brief decision the Supreme Court held that under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a state could not permit censor-
ship of a motion picture by an administrative official upon a finding that
it was "sacrilegious." It stated that it was unnecessary for it to decide
whether a state might censor a motion picture for obscenity under a
clearly drawn statute. The Court avoided the use of any "vagueness"
language, but spoke instead of the "broad and all-inclusive definition of
'sacrilegious' given by the New York courts."
The result in the Burstyn case suggests that there is still an important
role for the doctrine of Stromberg, Herndon and Winters in the area of
providing standards for the exercise of administrative discretion. Where
a statute gives an administrator authority to license speech and-assembly
it must at least provide standards for the exercise of his discretion if
constitutional objections are to be avoided. This is quite a contrast with
the procedural due process cases, particularly in the economic controls
area, where almost any delegation however vague will be upheld.
79 343 U.S. 495 (1952). See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), where the Court
struck down refusal to give a permit for religious meeting to one who "ridicule[s] or
denounce[s] any form of religious belief"; cf. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
In Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952), on authority of the Burstyn case, another motion
picture licensing statute was struck down, the standard being whether the picture was "of
such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the people of said City."
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III. AVOIDANCE OF THE UNCERTAINTY DOCTRINE.
In the foregoing discussion it has been suggested that application of
the uncertainty doctrine is far from automatic or even frequent. There
have been many more cases where uncertainty contentions were over-
ruled than where they were accepted. Some discussion of those cases is
important in appraising the doctrine.
At least four rationales or explanations are utilized by the Supreme
Court when it refuses to find a statute unconstitutionally uncertain. These
are:
a. Construction of the statute in such a way as to avoid uncertainty;
b. Finding that a requirement of scienter (sometimes written into
the statute by construction) clarifies the statute;
c. Finding external standards which clarify the uncertain statutory
standards; and
d. Finding that the statute is not uncertain in comparison with other
statutes earlier held constitutionally certain.
A. Construction
The most important rationale or process utilized by the Court to
avoid uncertainty is interpretation. Both substantive and procedural due
process uncertainties may be circumvented in this manner. Construction
will give definiteness to vague standards. A narrow interpretation will
remove objectionable breadth of application. Where a federal statute is
concerned the Court itself may utilize construction to render the statute
more certain. However, when dealing with a state statute it feels bound
by the construction of the state courts.
The danger of utilizing construction to remove uncertainty is the pos-
sibility of ex post facto application. If a statute as drafted is so vague
that its scope cannot be foreseen, it would seem to be unfair to apply it
to past acts upon the basis of a subsequent interpretation. "It would be
hard to hold that, in advance of judicial utterance upon the subject, [de-
fendants] . . . were bound to understand the challenged provision
according to the language later used by the court."' The philosophy of
the cases involving prior restraints upon First Amendment freedoms is to
permit even one who could be held under a narrowly drawn statute to
raise the uncertainty objection. It seems contrary to this philosophy to
permit a statute to be applied retrospectively after it has been narrowly
construed to avoid constitutional difficulties. Until the time of the narrow
80 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 456 (1939); accord, Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S.
553, 563-565 (1931).
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construction the statute may constitute a serious restraint upon freedom
of speech.
Nevertheless, it apparently is settled that a state court's interpretation
of a statute is binding upon the federal courts. The construction of a
statute is a ruling on a question of state law which is as binding upon the
Supreme Court as though the precise words had been written into the
statute.8 ' The Court assumes that the defendant in the case before it
"at the time he acted, was chargeable with knowledge of the scope of
subsequent interpretation."8 " Even a contention that the construction
is contrary to the terms of the statute is unavailing. 3 There are a number
of important cases where state courts have been upheld in construing
vague or general statutes to avoid application of the uncertainty
doctrine. 4 This is not to say that the Court may not go ahead and hold
a statute unconstitutionally uncertain even in the face of a narrow con-
struction. Thus if it can locate any flaw or inconsistency in the language
of the state courts which have construed and applied the statute it may
utilize such a defect as a basis for holding the conviction unconstitutional,
as in the Stromberg and Terminiello cases.
The construction approach to remedying uncertainty is also available
where federal statutes are concerned. Perhaps the most famous example
of its utilization was in Screws v. United States.15 The Civil Rights Acts
make it a crime wilfully under color of law to subject any inhabit-
ant because of his color or race "to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and
laws of the United States." Screws, a sheriff, was charged with beating
a Negro prisoner to death thereby depriving him of his constitutional
rights to be tried in accordance with due process of law and not to be
deprived of life without due process of law. It was objected that the
81 Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 402 (1953); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
1, 4 (1949) ; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. at 514-515.
82 Winters v. New York, supra note 81.
83 Minnesota v. Probate Ct., 309 U.S. 270 (1940). The state court had taken the words
"psychopathic personality," defined as "existence . . . of emotional instability, or impulsive-
ness of behavior . . . as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to
sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons," and construed it to apply only to
persons "who, by an habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter
lack of power to control their sexual impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack or
otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain, or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and
uncontrollable desire."
84 In addition to Minnesota v. Probate Ct., supra note 83, see, Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S.
345 (1949); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 84-85 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572-574 (1942); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-576 (1941); Fox
v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
85 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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statute provided no ascertainable standard of guilt because of the con-
flicting and changing views of the Supreme Court as to the meaning of the
due process clause. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute,
but reversed the conviction. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice
Stone and by Justices Reed and Black, held that to construe the statute
to require a wilful intent to deprive a person of a federal right made
definite by decision or by other rule of law would save it from any charge
of uncertainty. However, these justices were still forced to vote to
reverse the conviction for a new trial, since the court below had not
properly instructed the jury (upon the basis of this new concept as to
the meaning of the statute). Justice Rutledge thought the statute con-
stitutional as applied. However, he concurred in the judgment of reversal
in order that there might be a disposition of the case. Justice Murphy
also thought the statute constitutional as applied, and dissented; he
would have affirmed the conviction. Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and
Jackson rendered a joint dissent on the ground that the statute was un-
constitutionally vague. In other words, four justices thought the statute
should be construed to require a special intent, two thought it was all
right as it was, and three thought it was unconstitutionally vague.
The Supreme Court has also recognized a power to construe broad
federal statutes narrowly so as to avoid a holding of substantive due
process uncertainty, at least where this may be done in consonance with
the legislative purpose. For example, consider the Taft-Hartley Act re-
quirement that every officer of a union which wishes to utilize the bene-
fits of the Act make an affidavit "that he is not a member of the Com-
munist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe
in, and is not a member of or supports [sic] any organization that be-
lieves in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by
force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods." The only penal
sanction of that portion of the Act is that the wilful and knowing false
making of such an affidavit is criminal. The Court avoided constitutional
objections aimed at the breadth of the requirement by holding that the
belief required to be negated by the oath is a belief "in violent overthrow
of the Government as it presently exists under the Constitution as an
objective, not merely as a prophesy." (emphasis supplied)"6
The very important case of United States v. Harriss,7 decided in 1954,
is illustrative of the current reaction of the Court to utilizing interpre-
tation to assist in upholding a rather vague statute. This case involved
86 Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 406-408 (1950); cf. United States v.
C.I.0., 335 U.S. 106, 120-121 (1948).
87 347 U. S. 612 (1954).
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dismissal of a criminal information brought under the Federal Regula-
tion of Lobbying Act,88 upon the ground that the Act was unconstitu-
tional. The defendants were charged under Sections 305 and 308 of the
Act with failure to report the solicitation and receipt of contributions to
influence the passage of certain legislation, and failure to register.
The key section of the Act is Section 307 which makes it applicable
to any person (other than certain political committees) who "directly or
indirectly, solicits, collects, or receives money or any other thing of value
to be used principally to aid, or the principal purpose of which person is to
aid, in the accomplishment of any of the following purposes:
"(a) the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the
United States.
"(b) to influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any
legislation by the Congress of the United States."
Section 305 and 308 require such persons (with specified exceptions
to Section 308 in the case of public officials, newspapers, and persons who
merely appear before committees) to register and render certain reports.
These were the sections under which the Harriss information was
brought.
It is readily apparent, that the application of the Act raises problems
both of substantive and procedural due process. On its face it is broad
enough to constitute an abridgement of First Amendment rights, the
rights of freedom of speech, publication and petition. Furthermore, the
terms "directly or indirectly," "principal purpose," and "principally"
make application of the statute uncertain.
Despite these problems, the Supreme Court, in a five to three decision
(Justice Clark taking no part), upheld the constitutionality of the statute
by a process of interpretation. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Warren, held that the Act applies only to lobbying in its commonly ac-
cepted sense, "to direct communication with members of Congress on
pending or proposed federal legislation." The word "principal" was
used to exclude from the scope of the Act those contributions and per-
sons having only an incidental purpose of influencing legislation. If one
of the "main purposes" was to influence the passage or defeat of legisla-
tion, the person or contribution would be within the scope of the Act.
Thus construed Sections 305 and 308 were held to meet the constitutional
requirements of definiteness, and not to violate the freedoms guaranteed
by the First Amendment.
Justice Douglas (with Justice Black concurring) dissented upon the
ground that the Act on its face was so broad that it interfered with First
88 60 Stat. 812, 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270 (1952).
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Amendment prohibitions. One who wrote a letter or made a speech or
published an article could not know from the language of the Act when
he was close to the prohibited line. He felt that the Court had rewritten
the Act and actually added and subtracted words to produce the result
attained. He concluded:
No construction we give it today will make clear retroactively the vague
standards that confronted appellees when they did the acts now charged
against them as criminal.. . . Since the Act touches on the exercise of First
Amendment rights, and is not narrowly drawn to meet precise evils, its
vagueness has some of the evils of a continuous and effective restraint.89
Justice Jackson also dissented giving as his main reason the extent to
which the Court had rewritten the Act, in effect leaving it touching upon
only part of the practices which the Congress had deemed sinister. He
also noted that the Court had rejected the broad interpretation contended
for by the Government and adopted its own narrower construction. This,
he thought, helped to demonstrate that the Act was "mischievously
vague."l
No federal statute in the substantive due process area has ever been
held unconstitutionally uncertain. The Harriss case demonstrates the
process which will probably be followed when the Court is faced with a
federal statute which impinges on First Amendment freedoms. The Court
will struggle to narrowly construe the statute to avoid the constitutional
objection. Of the present membership of the Court, five justices-Chief
Justice Warren, Justices Reed, Burton, Frankfurter and Minton-were
willing to adopt the construction approach in the Harriss case.
B. Scienter.
A second important rationalization used to avoid application of the
uncertainty doctrine is to find that scienter is an element of the offense
and that the statute as a result is sufficiently clear. The presence of
scienter has been found significant in many cases, and in no cases where
it has been found and discussed has the statute in question been held
unconstitutionally vague.9"
The effect of scienter upon an otherwise uncertain statute has been
stated in various ways. The Court has said that "since the constitutional
vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in plac-
ing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair
warning, the fact that punishment is restricted to acts done with knowl-
89 347 U.S. at 633.
00 Wilfuilness was required by the Lever Act held unconstitutional in the Cohen Grocery
case. The Court in that case did not allude to this factor. Since the case came up on a demur-
rer to the indictment there was of course no instruction as to the type of intent required.
1955]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
edge that they contravene the statute makes this objection untenable."'"
Again, in Screws v. United States, the Court suggested that "where the
punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose
of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to
suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a
violation of law. The requirement that the act must be willful or pur-
poseful may not render certain, for all purposes, a statutory definition of
the crime which is in some respects uncertain. But it does relieve the
statute of. the objection that it punishes without warning an offense of
which the accused was unaware." 92 Again, in Dennis v. United States,93
the Court was required to determine the constitutionality of portions of
the Smith Act which made it criminal knowingly and willfully to "advo-
cate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of
overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence." The Court in holding the statute sufficiently certain said that the
vagueness argument was particularly nonpersuasive when advanced by
petitioners, who had been found by the jury to intend forcible overthrow of
the Government as speedily as circumstances would permit. The stat-
utory standard, although "not a neat, mathematical formulary . . . well
serves to indicate to those who would advocate constitutionally pro-
hibited conduct that there is a line beyond which they may not go-a
line which they, in full knowledge of what they intend and the circum-
stances in which their activity takes place, will well appreciate and
understand."9' 4
This rationalization has a plausible sound, but will it stand analysis?
First consider the substantive due process cases. The so-called un-
certainty in those cases is caused by broad language which on its face
would punish acts which cannot constitutionally be prohibited. When
the element of scienter is added, some of the difficulty may disappear.
Only those with a bad purpose can be punished. If the class of persons
with the requisite bad purpose who do the prohibited acts happens to
include only those who can constitutionally be punished, the statute is
not too broad. The requirement of scienter then effectively restricts the
otherwise broad application of the statute and it is not a prior restraint
upon First Amendment freedoms. Under certain circumstances then,
scienter may assist in avoiding substantive due process uncertainty.
The procedural due process cases are much more troublesome. If a
91 Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,413 (1950).
92 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945).
93 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
94 Id. at 515-516.
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statute is so vague as to have no meaning, it is a contradiction in terms to
say that guilty knowledge or evil purpose cures the vagueness. One can-
not know or have an evil purpose to do what is unknowable. What would
the element of scienter have added to the facts of the International Har-
vester case? Justice Holmes said that to determine "real value" was a
"problem that no human ingenuity could solve," it would require men
"to divine prophetically . . . and . . . exact gifts that mankind does not
possess." If the statute was that vague, could an additional element of
scienter have cured it?
A minority of the Court recognized the logical defects of the scienter
refinement to the uncertainty doctrine in the procedural due process area,
in the classic joint dissent in the Screws case. 5 To Justices Roberts,
Frankfurter and Jackson, the suggestion that the vagueness of the statute
was cured by holding it applicable only where the defendant had the
"requisite bad purpose" amounted "to saying that the black heart of the
defendant enables him to know what are the constitutional rights de-
privation of which the statute forbids, although we as judges are not able
to define their classes or their limits . . ." The definiteness required by
the Constitution "is a definiteness defined by the legislature, not one
argumentatively spelled out through the judicial process which, precisely
because it is a process, cannot avoid incompleteness. A definiteness which
requires so much subtlety to expound is hardly definite." The opinion
went on:
It is as novel as it is an inadmissible principle that a criminal statute of in-
definite scope can be rendered definite by requiring that a person "willfully"
commit what Congress has not defined but which, if Congress had defined,
could constitutionally be outlawed. . . . If a statute does not satisfy the
due-process requirement of giving decent advance notice of what it is which,
if happening, will be visited with punishment, so that men may presumably
have an opportunity to avoid the happening. . ., then "willfully" bringing
to pass such an undefined and too uncertain event cannot make it sufficiently
definite and ascertainable. "Willfully" doing something that is forbidden,
when that something is not sufficiently defined according to the general con-
ceptions of requisite certainty in our criminal law, is not rendered suffi-
ciently definite by that unknowable having been done "willfully." It is true
also of a statute that it cannot lift itself up by its bootstraps.9 6
To illustrate their feeling that scienter as a cure for vagueness is a
complete non sequitur, the dissenting justices pointed out that it would
be a function of the trial judge to define to the jury the standards im-
posed by the statute, that is, to instruct the jury as to the range of rights
deprivation of which' is prohibited by the Constitution. To define the
95 325 U.S. 91, 138 (1945).
96 Id. at 153-154.
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vague statutory standards would be a question of law for the trial court.
Only after the jury had been instructed as to the meaning of the stand-
ards would it determine the factual issue of whether the acts had been
wilfully done. The requirement of scienter could not possibly aid the
judge in construing the statute, since the presence of that element would
not be determined until after he had determined its meaning.
It is difficult to see how a requirement of a specific intent can make
vague standards definite. Ordinarily the only proof of intent is circum-
stantial evidence. For example, in cases under the Civil Rights Acts
usually the only evidence to prove intent to deprive the victim of a con-
stitutional right is the fact that the accused was an officer of the law who
by inference should have known what he was doing. On the other hand
the accused himself may be permitted to testify that he had no intention
of depriving anyone of a constitutional right. The evidence may be as
consistent with an act of violence growing out of ignorance and race
prejudice as with intent to deprive the victim of a constitutional right. Yet
the case goes to the jury with an instruction not to convict unless it finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had a deliberate and wilful
purpose to deprive the victim of a constitutional right.9" The jury is
aware of the unlikelihood that the accused will ever be tried under state
law. The real question before it may well be whether to do rough justice
under the Civil Rights Acts or to permit the defendant forever to go
unpunished.
Perhaps the explanation of the Screws case (and possibly the Harriss
case as well) lies in the exigencies of the situation rather than in the
judicial logic of the opinions. Perhaps, the majority was desirous of at-
taining a result. The Civil Rights Acts were passed in 1870, at a time
when the Southern states were represented only by carpetbaggers. If the
Court were to hold the Acts unconstitutional, chances of reenactment
with more definite standards are somewhat remote. If Screws, Crews,
Williams, Koehler and their ilk are to be punished under a federal statute,
the Civil Rights Acts must be upheld.
What then of other procedural due process uncertainty cases where a
majority of the Court discussed scienter and found a statute sufficiently
certain without provoking a similar dissent?9" The minority in the Screws
case noted those cases. They pointed out that in them the uncertainty
objection bordered on the frivolous. The statutes involved were said to be
97 See, e.g., Koehler v. United States, 189 F.2d 711, 714-715 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 852.
98 See, in addition to the cases mentioned in the text, United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S.
513, 524 (1942) ; Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1941) ; Hygrade Provision Co.
v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 501-502 (1925) ; Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348 (1918).
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sufficiently certain and the scienter discussion was thrown in "as is the
way of opinions." The Court, in those cases, "was saying that the criminal
statute under scrutiny, although very specific [sic], did not expose any
innocent person to the hazards of unfair conviction, because not merely
did the legislation outlaw specifically definite conduct, but guilty knowl-
edge of such defined criminality was also required."99
In other words, a statute may be vague, but not so obscure that there
are no cases in which it cannot be fairly applied. The additional element
of scienter makes it seem fairer to apply such a statute to extreme cases.
It assists in giving meaning to a statute which has some degree of cer-
tainty in its terms. When the Court states that the requirement of scienter
makes the uncertainty contention untenable, it may actually mean that
the statute is not so vague that it would be unfair to hold one who with a
bad purpose violates it. As a result of the requirement of scienter it is
easier to draw the line intended by the legislature.
C. External Standards
A third rationalization utilized to avoid application of the uncertainty
doctrine merits but a brief discussion; it is to find something external to
the objectionable language which tends to make it definite.' 00 Thus the
Court may say that the context of the statute supplies a standard.' Or
it may find a standard in the very nature of the problems involved. For
example, in upholding a statute which made it a crime under certain cir-
cumstances to build a fire "near" the public domain, Justice Holmes said:
"The word 'near' is not too indefinite. Taken in connection with the dan-
ger to be prevented it lays down a plain enough rule for anyone who seeks
to obey the law."'02
The terms may have a technical or other special meaning sufficient to
enable those to whom the statute is applicable to understand it. A statute
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those "who are subject to it" what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. 0 All that
99 325 U.S. 91, 157 (1945).
100 If the Court wants to find a statute unconstitutional it may apply the reverse of this
process, reading the objectionable language out of context as in the Stromberg and Termini-
ello cases.
101 Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1, 9 (1938).
102 United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927); cf. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
at 518; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1945) ; Connally v. General Const. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391-392 (1926); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 501 (1925).
103 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); cf. Communications Assn.
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79 (1949); Kay v.
United States, 303 U.S. 1, 9 (1938); Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 242-
243 (1932); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, supra note 102, at 502; Omaechevarria v.
Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348 (1918).
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is needed is a meaning for the words. The dictionary definitions may be
in agreement or the words well known,' or the terms may have a com-
mon law meaning.' 0 5 They may have been used in other statutes.' 6
D. Comparison with Other Statutes
An even more unconvincing rationalization is to find that statutes of
comparable uncertainty have been held sufficiently certain, therefore the
statute in question is valid.'01 Thus in the Boyce case the Court relied
heavily upon an earlier case where the term "shortest practicable route"
had been held sufficiently certain. In that earlier case the basic standard
was distance; the trucker was prohibited from carrying more than the
prescribed load unless he utilized the shortest practicable route. Only
when he exceeded the load limit and departed from the shortest route was
he required to find justification in practicability. As the dissenters in
Boyce pointed out it was completely different to require a trucker to avoid
"so far as practicable, and, where feasible" a list of undefined places, some
or all of which would be found on every route.
These then are the rationalizations utilized to avoid application of the
uncertainty doctrine.' 08 The interpretation and scienter approaches are
very important. The others are unconvincing from a logical point of view.
However, all of these rationalizations are useful, since far more often than
not they are accepted by the Court.
104 Cf. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 455 (1939); Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S.
445, 450 (1904).
105 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 455 (1939); Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Commission,
286 U.S. 210, 242-243 (1932) ; Connally v. General Const. Co. 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926);
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223 (1914); Nash v. United States,
229 U.S. 373 (1913).
106 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 455 (1939). But see Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948).
107 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 368-369 (1927).
108 It should be noted that the doctrine of Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549
(1947), that the Court will refrain from passing on questions of constitutionality of a statute
until the case reaches a stage where such a decision is necessary, is inapplicable where a ques-
tion of uncertainty is raised. The Government argued in United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S.
1 (1947), that it would be preferable not to decide the constitutional argument on a motion
to dismiss, but the Court said (at 5-6): ". . . the motion to dismiss on the ground of vague-
ness and indefiniteness squarely raises the question of whether the section invoked in the
indictment is void in toto, barring all further actions under it, in this, and every other case.
. . . Many questions of a statute's unconstitutionality as applied can best await the refine-
ment of the issues by pleading, construction of the challenged statute and pleadings, and,
sometimes proof. . . . But no refinement or clarification of issues which we can reasonably
anticipate would bring into better focus the question of whether the contested section is
written so vaguely and indefinitely that one whose conduct was affected could only guess
what it meant."
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IV. RiEVITALIZATION OF THE DOCTRINE-A PROPOSAL
In the previous discussion an attempt has been made to outline the un-
certainty doctrine as applied in Supreme Court cases. It has been shown
to be a doctrine rarely and reluctantly applied to strike down a statute.
Originally used to require that statutes supply explicit standards of con-
duct, it came to be used to invalidate statutes so broad as to punish consti-
tutionally protected conduct. Even in the latter area it seems to have
fallen somewhat into discard, although the Court may reach the same
result by other routes.
Unquestionably the consequences of protecting the civil liberties of
Communists and purveyors of lewd books and motion pictures is to fur-
ther the civil liberties of us all. But are not economic liberties also im-
portant? Business men and corporations perform useful functions. Why
not also require definiteness in statutes relating to them? Certainly
no one can quarrel with the principle that any statute whether criminal
or civil should be sufficiently certain to inform those subject to it of the
conduct which is required and to guide the judge and jury in its applica-
tion. Why not make more frequent use of the doctrine? To hold a statute
unconstitutionally uncertain usually is no bar to its legislative revision
and clarification. Congress is alert in making readjustments where judicial
interpretation is contrary to its purposes.1 °9 Instead of upholding every
statute no matter how vague because of disdain for judicial supremacy or
reluctance to interfere with legislative pronouncements, would it not be
better simply to refuse adjudication pending legislative clarification? To
require statutory certainty is not judicial supremacy. It is the special
function of courts to adjudicate. If a statute is vague, why not refuse to
apply it until the legislature makes proper adjudication possible?
Most of the contact between business and Government is at the admin-
istrative level. Corporations and business men dare not operate without
considering applicable administrative regulations. Furthermore, they act
in constant fear of possible administrative action should they violate some
statute or regulation. Their problems in this respect would be greatly
simplified if statutes, regulations and administrative orders were clear and
definite.
Two recent cases illustrate possible uses of the uncertainty doctrine in
109 See, e.g., The McGuire Act, 66 Stat. 631 (1952), clarifying the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1952), in light of Schwegmann v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); 59
Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1946), adopted as a result of United States v.
Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944) ; and 67 Stat. 476 (1953), amending
21 U.S.C. § 374, adopted in 1953 as a result of United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952),
discussed supra at note 52.
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the economics area. In the Boyce case already discussed the Court upheld
a vague penal administrative regulation. Justice Jackson, joined by Jus-
tices Frankfurter and Black, felt that the Court should deny enforcement
to the regulation. He said:
Would it not be in the public interest as well as the interest of justice to
this petitioner to pronounce this vague regulation invalid, so that those who
are responsible for supervision of this dangerous traffic can go about the
business of framing a regulation that will specify intelligent standards of
conduct? 1 o
In truth why shouldn't such regulations be stated clearly and defi-
nitely? Surely the Interstate Commerce Commission with its vast man-
power and experience can draft a regulation which would enable truckers
of explosives and other dangerous substances to plan their routes with
some assurance that they are complying with the law.
In another case, Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co.,"' the
Court dealt with the problem of a vague administrative order of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. A manufacturer was found to have committed
several violations of the Robinson-Patman Act. 2 The Commission's
trial examiner recommended a limited and specific cease and desist order,
however, the Commission substituted a sweeping order to "cease and de-
sist in discriminating in price: By selling such products of like grade and
quality to any purchaser at prices lower than those granted other pur-
chasers who in fact compete with the favored purchasers in the resale
or distribution of such products." The order in terms was more gen-
eral than the Act itself, since it failed even to include the statutory
provisos and exceptions. The manufacturer petitioned for review of
the order, attacking its breadth. The Commission cross-petitioned for
enforcement. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with Judges
Learned and Augustus Hand, and Clark sitting, affirmed the order but
denied its enforcement. The Second Circuit excused the breadth of the
order for the reason that the Act "is vague and general in its wording and
. . .cannot be translated with assurance into any detailed set of guiding
yardsticks." In other words that court thought the Act so vague that
certainty should not be required of the Commission in its cease and desist
orders thereunder. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion, 1 agreed with the Second
Circuit that: "This section of the Act admittedly is complicated and vague
110 Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337,346 (1952).
111 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
112 For sake of brevity Clayton Act § 2, as amended by 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1952), is spoken of here as the Robinson-Patman Act.
113 343 U.S. 470, 480 (1952).
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in itself and even more so in its context." However, he would have refused
to excuse the Commission on this ground. He pointed out that there are
no "public" sanctions under the Act until after the issuance of a cease and
desist order punishable by contempt proceedings. The Act should be re-
garded as an unfinished law which the administrative body must complete
before it is ready for application. "The only reason for the intervention
of an administrative body is to exercise a grant of unexpended legislative
power to weigh what the legislature wants weighed, to reduce conflicting
abstract policies to a concrete net remainder of duty or right." The admin-
istrative function in such a case is to translate the abstract statute into a
concrete cease and desist order. But here the Commission found it adminis-
tratively more convenient to "blanket an industry under a comprehensive
prohibition in bulk -an undiscriminating prohibition of discrimination
. . . this not only fails to give the precision and concreteness of legal duties
to the abstract policies of the Act, it really promulgates an inaccurate
partial paraphrase of its indeterminate generalities. Instead of completing
the legislation by an order which will clarify the petitioner's duty, it con-
founds confusion by literally ordering it to cease what the statute permits
it to do."
In the civil liberties area the Court refuses to permit the delegation of
administrative censorship or licensing powers without narrow standards.
In the economics area, at least in recent years, delegation seems to be per-
mitted no matter how vague the standards, witness the Ruberoid case.
Assuming that the distinction is valid, does it necessarily follow that the
administrator in the economics area is under no obligation to fill in the
gaps of the uncertain statute, to make clear the obligations of those to
whom the statute is applicable? Justice Jackson's thesis in the Boyce and
Ruberoid cases was to require administrative regulations and orders to be
definite, otherwise to deny them judicial sanction. In recent years there
has been great progress in the theoretical basis of administrative law. By
the Administrative Procedure Act, the practices of administrative rule
making and adjudication are controlled and regulated. By the Federal
Register Act expensive and comprehensive arrangements have been made
to assure that agency rules and orders are widely promulgated. What
earthly good is all this if no one can understand the rules and orders after
they are issued?
The problems of corporations and business men in a bureaucratic so-
ciety are by no means confined to administrative regulations and orders.
They also are faced with innumerable statutory requirements. The vari-
ous anti-trust acts are examples. Can a large and aggressive corporation
possibly go about its business without violating these acts or at least risk-
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ing prosecution? The objective of the Sherman Act is to enforce competi-
tion. The objective of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts is to
protect individual businesses against the normal effects of competition.
Caught in the middle is the corporation, damned under one statute if it
is considerate of its competitors, damned under others if it is not. If it
establishes a nation-wide uniform pricing system, it runs the risk of
prosecution under the Sherman Act. If these prices happen to be the same
as those of a competitor, proof of a violation may be ridiculously simple
under the doctrine of "conscious parallelism." If it attempts to compete
in the traditional fashion by varying its prices to attract customers, it runs
the risk of a Commission proceeding, or, even worse, a treble-damage suit.
Proof in the Robinson-Patman proceeding is also simple, since a showing
of price discrimination in interstate commerce (seemingly any difference
in prices for the same articles) is prima facie proof of violation. The
vagueness of the Robinson-Patman Act is not only in the problem of its
construction in context with the Sherman Act. It also is full of ambiguities
and vague provisions. It uses, for example, the terms "discriminate,"
"price" and competition" without definition, and, 'as Justice Jackson
pointed out in the Ruberoid case, prohibits only those "discriminations"
which meet three statutory conditions and survive five statutory provisos.
The statutes dealt with by Justice Holmes in the International Harvester
case seem simple in comparison.
The Court in the Ruberoid case upheld a vague Federal Trade Com-
mission order issued under the Robinson-Patman Act. What of the stand-
ards of the Act itself? Justice Jackson and the Second Circuit thought
the Act vague.114 Justice Jackson's dissent was seemingly based upon the
premise that the Court was bound to accept the vague Robinson-Patman
Act. He was concerned only with the required certainty of cease and desist
orders issued under the Act. He shrugged off the vagueness of the Act by
saying that it could be cured by definite orders of the Commission, since
there would be no "public" sanction until after the order was issued. But
is this an adequate basis for accepting this statutory vagueness? Justice
Jackson failed to discuss the very real fact of private sanctions. Others
than the Federal Trade Commission can enforce the Act. Competitors
can enforce it with treble-damage actions without awaiting the benefit of
clarifying Commission orders." 5
114 See also, United States v. New York Great A & P Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 676-677'
(E.D. Il. 1946), where the court, after a discussion of the "elusive uncertainty" of the Act,
doubted that any judge would assert that he knew exactly what is a violation in any and all
circumstances.
115 E.g., Sun Cosmetic Shoppe v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 81 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) ; see Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 750 (1947).
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The Federal Trade Commission and Interstate Commerce Commission
are two of hundreds of agencies with which business men are concerned.
The Boyce and Ruberoid cases are merely illustrative of permitted laxity
in administrative rule-making and adjudication. As Justice Jackson
pointed out in the Ruberoid case, the unsound result there was sympto-
matic of a basic confusion throughout the administrative scheme. One way
to attain responsible administrative agencies, to overcome administrative
inadequacies, is to surround agencies with strict statutory standards, and
to require their regulations and orders to be definite. The procedural due
process uncertainty doctrine would be a useful means to that end.
